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Mahmoud Fatouh
Small banks are inclined to have extra specialised enterprise fashions, possible specializing in industrial and retail banking actions, and present restricted interconnectedness to different monetary establishments. Therefore, they’re more likely to present much less intense cyclical patterns in comparison with giant banks. This submit investigates whether or not giant and small banks within the UK and US differ within the cyclical patterns of capital positions and credit score provision.
Introduction
Following the International Monetary Disaster, the Basel III reforms launched stricter capital necessities and strengthened them with cyclical elements (the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical capital buffer). The reforms aimed to make sure that banks have ample capital assets to soak up losses and scale back the cyclical results of financial institution capital (and regulation) on the availability of financial institution credit score in stress. The stricter and extra cycle-sensitive capital necessities ought to scale back the pro-cyclicality of financial institution capital positions as they discourage unsustainable credit score development in credit score booms, and so restrict the necessity for deleveraging in stress.
Beneath Basel III reforms, systematically vital banks face stricter necessities. Small banks largely face regulatory necessities like these of bigger banks however profit from some exemptions that differ in scope between jurisdictions. Moreover, regulators in varied jurisdictions have been making an attempt to create easier (however not weaker) regulatory frameworks for small banks. Ideally, a framework for smaller banks would consider their easier and specialised enterprise fashions, the restricted monetary stability implications of their failure, and the disproportional compliance prices they face in comparison with bigger banks. For instance, the Financial institution of England is designing a ‘strong and simple’ regulatory regime for small banks with easier enterprise fashions.
Owing to easier enterprise mannequin and weaker interconnectedness, small banks must be much less delicate to cyclical fluctuations insofar as their credit score provide and capital positions must be much less pro-cyclical than bigger banks. On this submit, I examine this speculation and research the implications of stricter cycle-sensitive capital necessities beneath Basel III for these cyclical patterns.
The info
I take advantage of bank-level knowledge and GDP development for the UK and the US. UK bank-level knowledge comes from a confidential knowledge set on the Financial institution of England and contains monetary knowledge on UK banks between 1990 and 2021. The info for US banks runs from 1979 to 2021 and was collected from a number of sources together with Refinitiv® Eikon, Capital IQ®, and revealed monetary statements. GDP knowledge was collected from the Workplace for Nationwide Statistics and FRED® for the UK and US respectively. Desk A contains abstract statistics of the bank-level and GDP development knowledge. The goal of getting a very long time collection is to have a pattern that covers at the very least a giant portion of a credit score cycle earlier than the introduction of the a lot stricter capital necessities by Basel III requirements in 2010. Stricter requirements would possible have an effect on the cyclical patterns of financial institution credit score and capital positions, doubtlessly decreasing the validity of outcomes. Though capital requirements existed earlier than 2010, they had been considerably weaker. Such time collection can be utilized to reply two questions. First, analysing years as much as 2009 can be utilized to measure the cyclical patterns in a much less regulated setting, offering proof on whether or not Basel III wanted cyclical elements. Second, increasing the evaluation past 2009 supplies proof on whether or not Basel III addressed the pro-cyclicality of financial institution capital and lending.
Desk A: Abstract statistics
1: UK knowledge (£ hundreds of thousands)
Obs. | Imply | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | |
GDP development | 8805 | 0.33% | 2.70% | -21.00% | 16.60% |
Whole property | 8762 | 21447.72 | 120595.90 | 0 | 1694721.00 |
Money | 8762 | 1413.30 | 8942.13 | 0 | 172085.00 |
Debt securities | 8762 | 1790.39 | 11886.20 | 0 | 181717.90 |
Whole loans | 8762 | 10279.93 | 48548.90 | 0 | 704557.30 |
Core fairness Tier 1 capital | 8761 | 702.03 | 3225.36 | 0 | 40519.10 |
Whole liabilities | 8762 | 20511.20 | 114370.00 | 0 | 1694721.00 |
Threat-weighted property | 8767 | 5987.31 | 27755.87 | 0 | 351969.60 |
Non-performing loans | 8801 | 160.83 | 878.86 | 0 | 15808.91 |
Mounted property | 8762 | 59.04 | 224.36 | 0 | 2369.83 |
Deposits | 8762 | 12618.16 | 58899.33 | 0 | 844488.30 |
Impairment expenses | 8799 | 27.81 | 183.24 | -165.54 | 5629.17 |
Pre-tax income | 8305 | 29.76 | 274.89 | -4430.14 | 10562.96 |
Whole off stability sheet commitments | 8762 | 4077.36 | 23359.22 | 0 | 280609.30 |
Leverage ratio publicity measure | 1590 | 34754.35 | 130993.50 | 0 | 1158652.00 |
Working bills | 8301 | 1.17 | 4.12 | 0 | 153.36 |
Deposits from banks | 8762 | 2230.71 | 11145.69 | 0 | 171070.40 |
Supply: Financial institution of England inside database.
2: US knowledge (US$ hundreds of thousands)
Obs. | Imply | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | |
GDP development | 1393739 | 0.66% | 0.74% | -2.18% | 2.28% |
Whole property | 1393739 | 1035.35 | 21700 | 0 | 2690000 |
Money | 138826 | 106.9572 | 2786.651 | 0 | 508000 |
Debt securities | 1355024 | 173.4477 | 4106.354 | 0 | 470000 |
Buying and selling property | 112260 | 73.4033 | 3098.621 | 0 | 380000 |
Whole loans | 1393418 | 523.0352 | 10100 | 0 | 1030000 |
Deposits | 1339080 | 452.4611 | 18900 | 0 | 1580000 |
Whole liabilities | 1388215 | 899.3584 | 19200 | 0 | 2450000 |
Fairness | 1334837 | 99.46378 | 2288.193 | 0 | 257000 |
Reverse repo | 1392499 | 49.89863 | 1932.282 | 0 | 321000 |
Subordinated debt | 1326818 | 8.075956 | 265.6903 | 0 | 29200 |
Sources: Refinitiv Eikon, S&P Capital IQ and revealed monetary statements.
Empirical technique
In an effort to measure the cyclicality patterns of capital ratios and whole lending of banks and examine whether or not they differ between small and enormous banks, I first categorise banks by dimension. For the UK, I take advantage of inside Financial institution of England classification of small and enormous banks. In the meantime, for US banks, I outline small and enormous banks as these within the lowest 80% and the best 5% of property distribution, respectively.
Following Fatouh and Giansante (2023), I measure cyclicality of a variable by the correlation between that variable and GDP development. I estimate this correlation utilizing the next panel regression:
(1)
the place, βi: financial institution mounted impact; Yi,t, capital ratio (fairness to whole property) or log of whole lending of financial institution i at time t; Xi,t, a set of bank-level controls, together with whole property, capitalisation, and ratios reflecting enterprise mannequin (eg, loans to asset and deposits to liabilities); GDPt, GDP development fee at time t.
Evaluation
I apply the mannequin in Equation 1 to small and enormous banks individually on the bank-level to detect variations within the cyclical behaviour of capital ratios and whole lending. The outcomes of the regressions are introduced in Desk B.
Because the desk reveals, capital ratios of enormous banks had been positively correlated with GDP development within the UK and US earlier than the introduction of Basel III in 2010. On common, a 1 proportion level fall in GDP development was related to an 80 foundation factors and 61 foundation factors drop in capital ratios of enormous banks within the UK and US, respectively. In the meantime, capital ratios of small banks had been both not correlated (UK) or negatively correlated (US) with GDP development.
Whole lending of enormous banks was pro-cyclical pre-Basel III, particularly within the UK. On common, a 1 proportion level fall in GDP development was related to a 302 foundation factors and 71 foundation factors fall in whole lending of enormous banks within the UK and US, respectively. The entire lending of small UK banks didn’t present cyclical patterns. Nevertheless, the full lending of small US banks was pro-cyclical, however considerably lower than that of enormous banks (11 foundation factors in comparison with 71 foundation factors for every 1 proportion level change in GDP development).
Desk B: Regression outcomes for financial institution capital ratios and whole lending
1: UK banks (1990–2009)
Variables | Capital ratio | Whole lending | ||
Giant banks | Small banks | Giant banks | Small banks | |
(1) | (2) | (1) | (2) | |
GDP development | 0.799*** | -0.00576 | 3.018*** | -0.621 |
(0.185) | (0.0105) | (1.032) | (1.693) | |
No. Obs. | 119 | 55 | 119 | 55 |
R-squared | 0.991 | 0.995 | 0.999 | 0.998 |
Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Financial institution FEs | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Notes: Coefficient estimates of quarterly capital ratios and whole lending of UK banks between 1990 and 2009. Capital ratio is the same as fairness to whole property, and whole lending is the log of web lending. Small and enormous banks are outlined based mostly on inside Financial institution of England classifications. Normal errors reported between parentheses, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
2: US banks (1979–2009)
Variables | Capital ratio | Whole lending | ||
Giant banks | Small banks | Giant banks | Small banks | |
(1) | (2) | (1) | (2) | |
GDP development | 0.612*** | -0.0720*** | 0.710*** | 0.112*** |
(0.133) | (0.00550) | (0.212) | (0.0271) | |
No. Obs. | 40,116 | 702,554 | 40,099 | 697,879 |
R-squared | 0.887 | 0.905 | 0.989 | 0.986 |
Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Financial institution FEs | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Notes: Coefficient estimates of quarterly capital ratios and whole lending of US banks between 1979 and 2009. Capital ratio is the same as fairness to whole property, and whole lending is the log of web lending. Small and enormous banks are these within the lowest 80% and the best 5% of property distribution, respectively. To make sure robustness of the outcomes, I additionally run regressions based mostly on totally different thresholds. Outcomes of the extra regressions are in step with the baseline outcomes. Normal errors reported between parentheses, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
In different phrases, the capital positions of enormous banks had been extra delicate to financial fluctuations than small banks in each the UK and US previous to Basel III. These traits in capital positions have an effect on the credit score provide of banks, relying on their dimension. Giant banks develop into comparatively capital-constrained in downturns, and therefore are inclined to ration lending. The decrease cyclicality of small banks’ capital positions permits them to maintain their provide of credit score steadier over the cycle. However, as giant banks present most of financial institution credit score, combination credit score crunches are anticipated, particularly in deep downturns.
Stricter capital necessities and cyclical elements (the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer) launched by Basel III ought to scale back the pro-cyclicality of enormous banks’ capital positions and provide credit score. To analyze this, I re-run the regressions above utilizing knowledge units that stretch past 2009. As Desk C reveals, the coefficient on GDP development for giant banks falls from 80 foundation factors to 43 foundation factors (at a decrease significance stage) for UK banks, and from 61 foundation factors to 29 foundation factors for US banks. Outcomes for small banks’ capital ratios utilizing the prolonged pattern are in step with the baseline in Desk B.
Submit Basel III, the pro-cyclicality of whole lending of enormous banks fell from 301 foundation factors to 165 foundation factors for giant UK banks and 71 foundation factors to 49 foundation factors for giant US banks. The professional-cyclicality of whole lending of small US banks fell additional (11 foundation factors to five foundation factors) and remained nicely under that of enormous banks.
Desk C: Regression outcomes for financial institution capital ratios and whole lending; Basel III impression
1: UK banks (1990–2021)
Variables | Capital ratio | Whole lending | ||
Giant banks | Small banks | Giant banks | Small banks | |
(1) | (2) | (1) | (2) | |
GDP development | 0.429** | -0.0192 | 1.645** | 0.00869 |
(0.204) | (0.0157) | (0.712) | (1.642) | |
No. Obs. | 347 | 326 | 330 | 304 |
R-squared | 0.985 | 0.968 | 0.998 | 0.988 |
Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Financial institution FEs | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Notes: Coefficient estimates of quarterly capital ratios and whole lending of UK banks between 1990 and 2009. Capital ratio is the same as fairness to whole property, and whole lending is the log of web lending. Small and enormous banks are outlined based mostly on inside Financial institution of England classifications. Normal errors reported between parentheses, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
2: US banks (1979–2020)
Variables | Capital ratio | Whole lending | ||
Giant banks | Small banks | Giant banks | Small banks | |
(1) | (2) | (1) | (2) | |
GDP development | 0.291*** | -0.0829*** | 0.493*** | 0.0530** |
(0.0607) | (0.00503) | (0.145) | (0.0247) | |
No. Obs. | 45,900 | 860,347 | 45,859 | 852,062 |
R-squared | 0.907 | 0.924 | 0.990 | 0.989 |
Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Financial institution FEs | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Notes: Coefficient estimates of quarterly capital ratios and whole lending of US banks between 1979 and 2009. Capital ratio is the same as fairness to whole property, and whole lending is the log of web lending. Small and enormous banks are these within the lowest 80% and the best 5% of property distribution, respectively. To make sure robustness of the outcomes, I additionally run regressions based mostly on totally different thresholds. Outcomes of the extra regressions are in step with the baseline outcomes. Normal errors reported between parentheses, * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
In abstract, the capital positions and credit score provide had been clearly extra pro-cyclical for giant banks than small banks. The introduction of extra cycle-sensitive capital necessities beneath Basel III decreased variations between the 2 teams of banks. As such, it may be argued that the cycle-sensitive elements of capital necessities are more practical in decreasing the pro-cyclicality of credit score provide of enormous banks (than small banks), as nicely the combination provide of financial institution credit score, decreasing the severity of credit score crunches in deep downturns.
Abstract
This submit assesses whether or not small banks’ whole lending and capital ratios present totally different cyclical patterns from bigger banks, and whether or not the introduction of stricter cycle-sensitive capital necessities beneath Basel III impacts these cyclical patterns. The evaluation makes use of knowledge for small and enormous banks within the UK and US. The empirical outcomes recommend that previous to Basel III reforms, capital positions and credit score provide of enormous banks had been rather more pro-cyclical than small banks. The introduction of extra cycle-sensitive capital necessities beneath Basel III decreased capital and credit score provide pro-cyclicality for giant banks, whereas having smaller results for small banks. This means that the cycle-sensitive capital necessities are more practical in decreasing the pro-cyclicality of credit score provide of enormous banks and decreasing severity of credit score crunch in deep downturns.
Mahmoud Fatouh works within the Financial institution’s Prudential Framework Division.
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